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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the Court has seemingly said that the prior cases have held only
that the due process clause, fourteenth amendment, and the con-
stitutional inhibition against impairment of contracts are no
bar to legislative alteration of municipal boundaries, but that
the fifteenth amendment is such a bar.1 4 This reasoning is at
least difficult to follow in view of the breadth of the language
in the Hunter case, wherein the Court stated that with respect
to municipal boundary change the state is supreme, unrestrained
by any provision of the United States Constitution, and the citi-
zens have no right by contract or otherwise to complain of this
exercise of power.' 5
Possibly the intention of the Alabama legislature was actual-
ly inquired into by the Court in the instant case. It is arguable
that the somewhat extreme result produced by the action of the
Alabama legislature in reshaping the City of Tuskegee into a
twenty-eight sided figure influenced the decision.' 6 Conceivably,
when the situation presented will produce less extreme results,
the Court will return to the position that it has no jurisdiction
to rule on the power of a state legislature to alter a municipal
boundary. However, it appears that in truth the Supreme Court
has decided to give the fifteenth amendment a preferred position
in this area. That the right to vote in a particular municipal
election should be afforded a more favorable position than due
process of law is at least a questionable result.
Sam J. Friedman
SALES - ADMISSION OF PAROL EVIDENCE TO ANNUL AN
AUTHENTIC ACT
Plaintiff instituted suit against his wife and son seeking,
inter alia, to have immovable property which he had transferred
to his wife during the existence of the community of acquets
and gains between them declared to be property of the com-
14. In a concurring opinion in the instant case, Mr. Justice Whittaker felt that
the decision should be based on a denial of equal protection of the fourteenth
amendment, rather than the right to vote provision in the fifteenth amendment.
He felt that the right to vote does not entitle a person to vote in a particular
municipal election, but only the general right to vote.
15. Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). See Laramie County v.
Albany County, 92 U.S. 307, 314 (1875).
16. For a diagram of the City of Tuskegee after the redefinition see the instant
case at page 131.
680 [Vol. XXI
1961] NOTES
munity. 1 The real estate had been conveyed to the wife as a giv-
ing in payment which was in authentic form and duly recorded
and purported to be by way of compensation to extinguish an
indebtedness of plaintiff to his wife. Plaintiff's offer of parol
evidence to demonstrate that there was actually no indebtedness
to sustain the dation en paiement was received, and the trial
court concluded that the property in question belonged to the
community. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, held,
affirmed. Although the parol evidence contradicts the recital of
the authentic act, it is admissible to prove that a dation en paie-
ment between husband and wife does not in fact fit one of the
exceptions to the general rule prohibiting onerous contracts be-
tween spouses.2 It is well settled3 that parol evidence is admis-
sible to show that an obligation has been contracted in frudem
legis, in contravention of a prohibitory law. Smith v. Smith, 239
La. 688, 119 So.2d 827 (1960).
The Louisiana Civil Code prohibits onerous contracts between
husband and wife with but three exceptions, and those not fall-
ing within these exceptions are invalid.4 The jurisprudence of
this state has not created additional exceptions to the general
rule prohibiting onerous agreements between spouses. However,
Article 1746 of the Code5 expressly permits husbands and wives
1. An ancillary hurdle surmounted by the plaintiff involved obtaining judicial
recognition of the fact that a subsequent transfer of the realty, in the form of an
act of sale, from plaintiff's wife to his son was a simulation designed to defraud
him of his interest in the land.
2. Smith v. Smith, 239 La. 688, 695, 119 So.2d 827, 829 (1960) : "Since con-
tracts between spouses are specifically forbidden by Articles 1790 and 2446 of the
Civil Code, save for the three purposes detailed in Article 2446, it follows that
any husband and wife who attempt to contract in violation of those restrictions
do so in fraudem legia."
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2446 (1870) : "A contract of sale, between husband and
wife, can take place only in the three following cases:
"1. When one of the spouses makes a transfer of property to the other, who
is judicially separated from him or her, in payment of his or her rights.
"2. When the transfer made by the husband to his wife, even though not separ-
ated, has a legitimate cause, as the replacing of her dotal or other effects alienated.
"3. When the wife makes a transfer of property to her husband, in payment of
a sum promised to him as a dowry.
"Saving, in these three cases, to the heirs of the contracting parties, their
rights, if there exist any indirect advantage."
Id. art. 2659 provides that the giving in payment is, in general, subjected to
all the rules applicable to ordinary contracts of sale.
It is well to point out at the outset that the court neglected to mention Article
1746 of the Code, which provides that donations inter vivos are permissible be-
tween husband and wife. Donations, while ordinarily not onerous in nature in
any sense of that word, are nonetheless frequently employed as the means of con-
veying title to property.
3. Citing Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913) ; Lazare v. Jacques,
15 La. Ann. 599 (1860) ; Ducote v. Stark, 87 So.2d 770 (La. App. 1956).
4. LA. CiviL CODE art. 2446 (1870). Cf. note 2 supra.
5. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 1746 (1870) : "One of the married couple may, either
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI
to transfer property to each other by means of a donation inter
vivos. A consistent line of cases6 has upheld the validity of trans-
fers of immovables purporting to be sales or givings in payment
as donations in disguise where the expressed consideration was
proved insufficient or totally lacking and where the instrument
satisfied the requirements of form vital to donations inter vivos
of immovable property.7 Hence, an authenticated dation en paxie-
ment between spouses, for the support of which no indebtedness
actually existed, could well be sustained as a donation in dis-
guise if the circumstances attending the transfer were such as
would satisfy the requirements for a valid donation.
The general rule of evidence in Louisiana pertaining to the
admissibility vel non of parol to vary or contradict the recital of
an authentic act is one of exclusion.8 However, one of the juris-
prudential exceptions to this rule allows the reception of parol
when the attack upon the transfer by authentic act is launched
on the theory that the conveyance was one made in fraudem
legis, or, literally, in fraud of the law. The cases in which this
exception has been recognized and parol received, with the result
that the transfer has been declared a nullity as one in contraven-
by marriage contract or during the marriage, give to the other, in full property,
all that he or she might give to a stranger [disposable portion]."
6. Reinerth v. Rhody, 52 La. Ann. 2029, 28 So. 277 (1900) ; mcWilliams
v. McWilliams, 39 La. Ann. 924, 3 So. 62 (1887) ; Harper v. Pierce, 15 La. Ann.
666 (1860) ; Wolf v. Wolf, 12 La. Ann. 529 (1857) ; Smre v. S6m~re, 12 La.
Ann. 681 (1856) ; D'Orgency v. Droz, 13 La. 382 (1839) ; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 10
La. 85 (1836) ; Trahan v. MeMannus, 2 La. 209 (1831) ; Holmes v. Patterson,
5 Mart.(O.S.) 693 (La. 1818) ; Nofsinger v. Hinchee, 199 So. 597 (La. App.
1941).
7. LA. CIVm CODE art. 1536 (1870) : "An act shall be passed before a notary
public and two witnesses of every donation inter vivos of immovable property or
incorporeal things, such as rents, credits, rights or actions, under the penalty of
nullity."
8. Id. art. 2236: "The authentic act is full proof of the agreement contained
in it, against the contracting parties and their heirs or assigns, unless it be de-
clared and proved a forgery."
Id. art. 2276: "Neither shall parol evidence be admitted against or beyond
what is contained in the acts, nor on what may have 'been said before, or at the
time of making them, or since."
The only codified exception to Article 2276 is found in id. art. 2239, which pro-
vides: "Counter letters can have no effect against creditors or bona fide pur-
chasers; they are valid as to all others; but forced heirs shall have the same right
to annul absolutely and by parol evidence the simulated contracts of those from
whom they inherit, and shall not be restricted to the legitimate (legitime]."
On the admission of parol evidence to attack the recital of an authentic act,
generally, see Comment, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 427 (1941).
Godwin v. Neustadl, 42 La. Ann. 735, 738, 7 So. 744, 745 (1890) : "It is horn-
book law in our jurisdiction that the verity and reality of authentic sales can be
assailed by the parties thereto only in two ways, viz.: (1) By means of a counter
letter; (2) by the answers of the other party to interrogatories on facts and
articles." Accord, Robinson v. Britton, 137 La. 863, 69 So. 282 (1915), and eases
cited therein.
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tion of a prohibitory rule of law, are dichotomous. There have
been cases in which the conveyance, appearing to have been made
for consideration received, was overturned by parol proof that
the consideration was lacking or insufficient to be counted as
serious and proof that, as a donation, it would be in violation of
the rule forbidding donations of immovables to one's concubine.9
In the second group of cases parol was received to prove no con-
sideration, in contradiction to the recitation of the act of trans-
fer, and adequate evidence was adduced to prove to the courts'
satisfaction that the transfer could not be sustained as a dona-
tion for the reason that, if a donation, it would be one omnium
bonorum, divesting the transferor of substantially all of his prop-
erty in violation of a prohibitory rule of law.10 With the excep-
tion of these two types of cases, no others have stood for the ad-
mission of parol for the purpose of attacking the recital of an
authentic act evidencing the transfer of immovable property
upon the in fraudem legis theory.
The instant case seems to provide some basis for a rule ad-
mitting parol when the annulment of a transfer of property by
authentic act is sought and the contention is simply that the act
of transfer is invalid as failing to comply with the requisites for
that particular type of transfer. The other cases admitting parol
when an onerous transfer in fraudem legis was alleged apparent-
ly received it only when it was proved that the transfer could not
be sustained either in its purported form or as a gratuitous do-
9. Succession of Dupre, 218 La. 907, 51 So.2d 317 (1950) ; Lazare v. Jacques,
15 La. Ann. 599 (1860).
See also Byrd v. Byrd, 230 La. 260, 88 So.2d 214 (1956), in which the court
set aside a purported sale on the grounds that there was no actual payment of
the recited consideration and that, as a donation in disguise, the transfer would be
void under Article 1533 of the Code and jurisprudence consistent therewith to the
effect that a donor cannot reserve the usufruct of the donated property to him-
self. It is not clear from the opinion whether parol was admitted, but it is doubt-
ful that the court could have obtained little of the information needed for the
decision in the absence of parol evidence.
10. Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913) (involving a purported
giving in payment by the husband to his wife, in which the court allowed proof
by parol of the lack of indebtedness to sustain the transaction as a dation and to
show that, as a donation, it divested the donor of the means of subsistence and
was thus prohibited by Article 1497) ; Ducote v. Stark, 87 So.2d 770 (La. App.
1956) (in which parol was admitted to overturn a purported sale for which no
consideration was given and which was insupportable as a donation, as it would
constitute one omnium bonorum); Armand v. Armand, 8 La. App. 810 (1928).
See also Cahow v. Hughes, 173 So. 471 (La. App. 1937), in which parol was held
admissible where the basis of attack was that there was no consideration for the
purported sale and that the conveyance could not be sustained as a donation as
it would be one omnium bonorum and therefore within the prohibition of Article
1497, but in which the court found that the evidence showed that there was in
fact ample consideration to support the transfer as a sale.
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nation in disguise. However, the court cited some of these cases
as authority for their position," without noting any distinction
between them and the case at bar. Furthermore, the court ex-
pressly refused to follow 12 the case of Thomas v. Thomas,1' re-
cently decided by a court of appeal, in which parol was held in-
admissible when offered to show that there had been no actual
indebtedness to support a purported dation in authentic form
where no proof that the transfer was insupportable as a donation
was offered. The earlier analogous cases 14 and the Thomas case
seem to reflect the rule that parol is admissible, under the in
fraudem legis exception, only to annul transfers by authentic act
where the proof is sufficient to demonstrate that the transfer
may be sustained as neither an onerous contract, nor a gratuitous
donation. And this view seems consonant with the decisions sus-
taining purportedly onerous contracts as donations in disguise.'5
In light of the fact that donations are ordinarily permissible be-
tween spouses, it well may be that the instant case represents a
departure from the prior applicable jurisprudence of this state.
Of course, the transfer in the instant case may have been a
pure simulation. Were this so, an argument could be made that
the plaintiff should be able to prove that there was no indebted-
ness and that the act merely effectuated the simulated convey-
ance. Proof of simulation would serve to show the absence of an
animus donandi, or intention to transfer gratuitously, generally
thought to be necessary for valid gratuitous donations.' The
11. See note 3 8upra.
12. Smith v. Smith, 239 La. 688, 699, 119 So.2d 827, 831 (1960).
13. 63 So.2d 468 (La. App. 1953).
14. See notes 9 and 10 supra.
15. See note 6 supra.
16. Although there is no express code authority for the proposition that an
intention to donate, or animus donandi, is required for a valid donation, Article
1523 of the Code, which provides, in part, that one kind of donation inter vivos
is the donation purely gratuitous and defines this kind as one "which is made
without condition and merely from liberality" seems indirect basis for this asser-
tion. (Emphasis added.)
Reference to Louisiana jurisprudence related to this matter does not prove
productive to any satisfactory extent, but dictum in Succession of Desina, 123 La.
468, 482, 49 So. 23, 28 (1909) and LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 80 So.2d 715, 719 (La.
App. 1955) does seem to provide some additional authority for deeming the inten-
tion to donate to be requisite for a valid donation of the purely gratuitous sort.
"In the final analysis, whether a contract is a donation or an onerous contract
depends upon the determining motive that dominated the party. Basically, a do-
nation stems from an intent to give as opposed to an intent to secure something
in return or to discharge an obligation, hence the statement that the cause of a
donation is the animus donandi. Its legal character therefore depends upon its
cause." Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LOUIsIANA LAW REvIEw 2, 7
(1951). See also Snellings, Cause and Consideration in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. REV.
178, 203 (1933).
Further support for the theory that valid donations spring, generally, from
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difficulty with this modus operandi is that the essence of the in
fraudem legis exception seems to be simply that the general rule
against verbal attacks on authentic acts of transfer should not
pose a bar to the annulment of transfers which are absolutely
prohibited by law, such as donations omnium bonorum, donations
of immovables to one's concubine, or, ordinarily, onerous obliga-
tions between husband and wife. Therefore, it appears that the
in fraudem legis exception should permit the use of parol only
when the purpose of the offerer is to prove that the conveyance
was a forbidden transfer. However, the law does not forbid sim-
ulations, reprobated as these artifices may be; although if they
are confected to the prejudice of interested third persons, these
injured parties may bring an action in declaration of the simu-
lation and avail themselves of parol proof that the contract was
simulated. But, even granting arguendo that consideration was
lacking, simulations are not provable by parol by parties to the
contract. 17 Consequently, it does not seem that a husband, party
to the act of transfer, should be allowed to prove by parol that
the authentic act actually represented a pure simulation. The
court's position, in disallowing parol, could either have been that
parties to simulated transfers in authentic form are barred from
establishing that fact by parol, or that the transfer was a sus-
the animus donandi, or the spirit of liberality which motivates the donor to divest
himself of his property in favor of the intended donee gratuitously, is to be found
in the writings of several French doctrinal authors. E.g., 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW
TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE)
no 2509 (1959) ; 5 PLANIOL ET IRIPERT, TRAITIk PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN-
QAIS, DONATIONS ET TESTAMENTS, no 313 et seq. (2d ed. 1957) ; 6 BEUDANT,
COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS, LES DONATIONS ENTRE VIFS ET LES TESTA-
MENTS, no 43 (2d ed. 1934) ; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET COLIN, TRAITil THtOR1QUE
ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, 1 DES DONATIONS ENTRE VIFS ET DES TESTAMENTS,
no 59 (2d ed. 1905) ; 1 POUJOL, TRAITt DES DONATIONS ENTRE VIFS ET DES TESTA-
MENS, SECTION PREMIkRE no 3 (1836).
17. See note 8 supra. It is conceivable that the court might decide to admit
the parol offered to show no consideration and that the transfer from husband to
wife was simulated. Such a decision would be grounded on the fact that the
intention to simulate negatives any animus donandi, and therefore there could
be no valid donation in disguise. Furthermore, it would not be a valid onerous
contract since these are permissible between husband and wife in only three
cases, and the agreement under consideration could be none of these in the absence
of indebtedness. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2446 (1870). However, it is submitted
that to admit parol on the strength of this reasoning would be questionable. First,
simulations are not prohibited contracts, and the in fraudem legis exception runs
only to such agreements. In the second place, it is the well-established policy of
the law to disallow the parties to simulations to establish their true nature by
means of parol. This policy was established, it seems not unlikely, for the reason
that ordinarily simulations will be made for fraudulent purposes, and it is not
the purpose of the law to encourage persons who attempt to perpetrate frauds
in their efforts to profit by such actions. "[W]e think ... that courts of justice
are not reduced to the humiliation of adjusting among dishonest men the results
of their unholy speculations or of protecting one party against another while
engaged in a common purpose, at war with the best interests of society and sub-
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tainable donation in disguise. 8 This determination would depend
upon the husband's apparent intention, as found by the court.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it is suggested
that the instant case is an unwarranted deviation from the rule
against the admission of parol to vary the recital of an authentic
act. The in fraudem legis exception, as applied prior to the in-
stant case, seems perfectly appropriate as a policy matter, for it
appears to implement the expressed intention of the lawmaker.
However, the application of this exception in the instant case
could lead to the overturning of authentic acts of transfer which,
in view of the fact that simulations are not prohibited by law
and the jurisprudence recognizing the validity of disguised dona-
tions, would not violate any prohibitory rule of law.
George M. Snellings III
versive of public order." Gravier's Curator v. Carraby's Executor, 17 La. 118,
130 (1841), in which the deceased's curator had sought to recover property
allegedly part of the estate of which defendant was executor, as the result of
simulated sales.
See Burch v. Nichols, 126 So.2d 713 (La. App. 1961), which relied on the
instant case for authority to a considerable extent, but which involved a sound
application of the rule that forced heirs may introduce parol to annul the simulated
contracts of those from whom they inherit.
18. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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